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Abstract. In previous work we presented Pico, an authentication sys-
tem designed to be both more usable and more secure than passwords.
One unsolved problem was that Pico, in its quest to explore the whole
solution space without being bound by compatibility shackles, requires
changes at both the prover and the verifier, which makes it hard to
convince anyone to adopt it: users won’t buy an authentication gadget
that doesn’t let them log into anything and service providers won’t sup-
port a system that no users are equipped to log in with. In this paper
we present three measures to break this vicious circle, starting with the
“Pico Lens” browser add-on that rewrites websites on the fly so that they
appear Pico-enabled. Our add-on offers the user most (though not all) of
the usability and security benefits of Pico, thus fostering adoption from
users even before service providers are on board. This will enable Pico to
build up a user base. We also developed a server-side Wordpress plugin
which can serve both as a reference example and as a useful enabler in
its own right (as Wordpress is one of the leading content management
platforms on the web). Finally, we developed a software version of the
Pico client running on a smartphone, the Pico App, so that people can
try out Pico (at the price of slightly reduced security) without having to
acquire and carry another gadget. Having broken the vicious circle we’ll
be in a stronger position to persuade providers to offer support for Pico
in parallel with passwords.
1 Introduction and motivation
For normal people, passwords are a pain. Their inadequacy in terms of both
usability and security has been repeatedly pointed out [1,4]. As people must
now handle dozens of accounts, passwords are a solution that can no longer
scale. Yet passwords continue to dominate as the well-entrenched incumbent
because, from the viewpoint of the verifier, they beat every alternative hands
down when it comes to ease of deployment [3].
Pico [11], which we briefly describe in Section 2, is our ambitious long-term
project to replace passwords with a more usable and more secure system that
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will not require you to memorize any secrets1. In its quest to explore the entire
solution space for the best possible solution in terms of usability and security,
Pico is a clean-slate redesign that explicitly gives up on compatibility with pass-
words. It is immediately clear that, in the short term, this choice will harm Pico’s
deployability. Our rationale is that, in the long term, passwords will become so
blatantly unacceptable that the world will eventually demand something better;
and, by then, Pico will have undergone several cycles of prototyping and testing
and will be ready for adoption as a user-friendly, secure and technically sound
solution that both users and service providers consider an improvement.
Having said that, in order to be ready for adoption when the time comes,
Pico has to be taken seriously by the stakeholders, both on the client side and
on the server side. For this reason, while we continue to investigate and de-
velop the architecture without considering ourselves constrained by backwards
compatibility, we also intend to provide a plausible migration path from the
current password-dominated scenario to a future one in which Pico has replaced
passwords. Charting this path is the topic of this paper.
Users won’t buy a Pico
because they cant log in
anywhere with it
Web sites won’t support
Pico because none of
their users has one
No web sites accept Pico
alongside passwords
No users have Pico
Fig. 1. The vicious circle opposing Pico adoption.
The main obstacle to widespread adoption of Pico is a classic vicious circle
(fig 1). Organizations that authenticate their users with passwords are reluctant
to change their servers to support an unfamiliar and unproven system, especially
if it also requires outfitting every user with a physical gadget at non-zero unit
cost. People, on the other hand, will be understandably reluctant to acquire,
carry and use a new authentication gadget, even if genuinely easier to use than
passwords, if it does not work with the services to which they wish (or need)
to authenticate. Our strategy involves disrupting this vicious circle in several
places. Where circular dependencies prevent users from adopting Pico before
1 The project’s website, http://pico.cl.cam.ac.uk/, contains a brief introductory
video, the original paper, a FAQ and other resources.
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servers have adopted it and vice versa, in this paper we present software modules
we have developed to break such dependencies.
Our first contribution, on the client side, is the “Pico Lens” web browser add-
on, described in Section 3: when you view a website through the Pico Lens, it
appears Pico-enabled even if it isn’t, so that you may authenticate to the website
using your Pico device rather than by typing your password. This breaks the
vicious circle for users because it allows them to use a Pico and reap most of its
usability benefits even before their favourite websites start offering native Pico
support. In turn, once enough people adopt Pico for its convenience, website
operators have more of an incentive to support the full Pico authentication
system alongside traditional password login.
Our second contribution, on the server side, is the “Pico Verifier” plugin
for Wordpress2, described in Section 4. It breaks the vicious circle for content
providers because it allows webmasters of Wordpress-based websites to make
their site Pico-enabled simply by installing the plugin, without any development
effort. This plugin also provides a reference implementation of the server side,
for webmasters who might wish to develop a Pico-enabled version of their non-
Wordpress website.
Our third contribution, on the client side, is the “Pico Prover” app for An-
droid smartphones, described in Section 5. This software breaks the vicious circle
for users because it allows them to use their existing smartphone as a Pico de-
vice, without having to buy (or carry) any extra hardware. The Pico Prover
app can to authenticate to both natively Pico-enabled verifiers and to non-Pico-
aware websites viewed through the Pico Lens, so it lets users reap many of the
usability and a few of the security benefits of a real Pico without any significant
investment. If they like the user experience (which, by releasing the app early,
we can refine and enhance while taking into account the feedback of many users
in a crowd-sourced fashion), they may wish to upgrade to a dedicated Pico,
which will eventually be smaller, simpler and more secure. The Pico Prover also
provides a reference implementation for the client side.
After a brief overview of the Pico system in Section 2 to make the presentation
self-contained, the rest of this paper describes each of these three contributions
in greater detail.
2 The Pico architecture in brief
The Pico system consists of the Pico device itself (a small, dedicated and tamper-
resistant hardware authenticator the size of a pedometer or a car key fob), acting
as the prover, and a back-end acting as the verifier. Even though the technical
contributions described in this paper focus on the use-case of web authentication,
2 According to W3techs statistics (http://w3techs.com/technologies/overview/
content_management/all/), as of February 2014, Wordpress is the most widely used
Content Management System on the web, being used by 21.5% of all websites and
by 60.0% of all websites that use a content management system.
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in which the verifier is a website, in the general case any entity that authenti-
cates its users (whether with or without passwords—think of car keys) could be
augmented with a Pico back-end.
Pico relies on a multi-channel authentication protocol [14] in which an ad-
ditional channel (acquisition of a QR code [7] in the current implementation)
conveys the user’s intent to authenticate to a designated verifier. The verifier
signals that it supports Pico authentication by displaying a Pico visual code,
perhaps alongside the conventional login prompt for user name and password.
The human prover signals her intent to authenticate to a particular verifier by
acquiring the verifier’s QR code with her Pico device. This action initiates the
execution of the Pico authentication protocol, which mutually authenticates the
verifier to the Pico and the Pico to the verifier.
In the current implementation the Pico system uses the SIGMA protocol
[8] for mutual authentication and generation of a symmetric session key. The
Pico prover and back-end verifier create digital signatures to prove ownership
of a public key, which is their long-term public identity. Pico has adopted the
“I” variant of the SIGMA protocol [8], in which the verifier must authenticate
its identity to the prover, before the prover reveals its identity to the verifier,
preventing any privacy loss to verifiers presenting “counterfeit” visual codes. To
protect the user’s privacy further the Pico uses a different key pair for every
account so that colluding verifiers cannot link accounts belonging to the same
user. A run of the SIGMA protocol also yields a fresh symmetric session key,
which the Pico and verifier use for continuous authentication.
In some cases, for example when logging into a local computer or when
opening a Pico-enabled door, the Pico prover device talks directly to the Pico
verifier that displays the QR code directly. In other cases, though, most notably
when logging into web sites, a third device is involved: when you authenticate
to a website with your Pico, you actually access your account for that website
through the web browser of your normal computer. In such cases the website
provides the authenticated Pico with a “session delegation token” (a cookie)
that the Pico then transfers to the web browser to delegate3 the session it has
authenticated4.
When the verifier is remote, as in the case of a website, the Pico needs a
connection to the Internet and a connection to the user’s web browser so that
the Pico can transfer the session delegation token to the web browser after
authenticating. In our implementation as of March 2014 the Pico connects to
the user’s computer via a Bluetooth Personal Area Network (PAN) and tunnels
out to remote services via this interface as well so that Pico doesn’t need to have
its own Internet connection via WiFi or via a mobile phone network.
3 Delegation is a process whereby a principal authorizes an agent to act on its behalf
by transferring a set of rights.
4 The session delegation protocol used by Pico is described in further detail in our
other paper “I bought a new security token and all I got was this lousy phish—
Relay attacks on visual code authentication schemes”, also in these proceedings.
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Pico offers continuous authentication, whereby the Pico device authenticates
to the verifier at regular intervals without user intervention, so long as the Pico
remains unlocked and in proximity of the computer running the web browser.
The verifier may thus keep the session open for as long as necessary but close
it immediately when the user is no longer present, minimizing the window of
vulnerability during which another person could hijack the session if the user
left the terminal unattended. In the current prototype we detect proximity with
a heuristic based on Bluetooth signal strength, though in the future we plan to
adopt a more secure distance bounding protocol [5,6].
As with any token-based authentication method, the Pico system must pro-
tect the token against misuse by others who might find or steal it. In our design
this is achieved through the Picosiblings mechanism [11,12]: the Pico device locks
up (with its credentials encrypted), pauses the continuous authentication of any
active session, and stops authenticating new sessions whenever it cannot sense
the “aura of safety” around its owner. The “aura” is defined by the proximity
of a sufficient number of other electronic devices (the Picosiblings) worn by that
person. A biometric sample and a connection to a home server also act as special
Picosiblings that offer additional protection properties and allow remote revo-
cation. Because this Picosibling-based locking mechanism is independent of the
normal operation of the Pico device and, particularly, of the “vicious circle of
adoption” alluded to above, it will not be discussed further in this paper.
The credentials stored in the Pico device are backed up automatically, in en-
crypted form, whenever the Pico is plugged into its docking station for recharg-
ing. Backup, too, despite being a fundamental component of the Pico architec-
ture, is independent of the “vicious circle of adoption” and will not be discussed
further in this paper.
3 The “Pico Lens” browser add-on
The “Pico Lens” is a web browser add-on that rewrites websites on the fly to
make them appear as if they support Pico alongside password authentication.
The Pico Lens detects web pages containing login forms and adds a Pico visual
code to them, alongside the existing username and password fields, so that Pico
users have the option of authenticating with their Pico instead of typing their
password.
Although the underlying methods used by the Pico to authenticate to Pico-
enabled and only Lens-enabled websites are quite different, our aim was to make
the user experiences as similar as possible. The end result in both modes of
operation is the same: the user’s web browser receives a session cookie granting




For comparison, authentication to a fully Pico-enabled website (that is, a website
that supports the real Pico authentication protocol) is described by the following
sequence of events.
1. The user, whose web browser has a Pico add-on installed5, navigates to a
login page.
2. The login page includes a visual code encoding the public key of the ser-
vice. If the full Pico Lens add-on is installed, it detects that the website is
Pico-enabled (for example through a pico-enabled HTML meta tag.), and
refrains from rewriting the page.
3. The user scans the visual code with their Pico.
4. If the user has multiple accounts for the website, they select one from the list
displayed by the Pico. If the user only has a single account for the website,
as is common, this step is skipped.
5. The Pico and the website mutually authenticate.
6. The website sends the Pico a fresh session delegation token, which for a web
authentication takes the form of a set of cookies and a URL.
7. The Pico sends the session delegation token to the local terminal via the
Bluetooth PAN.
8. The Pico add-on causes that browser to navigate to the URL contained in
the session delegation token.
When a website is not Pico-enabled, the Pico Lens add-on allows the user to
follow the same work flow, despite the differences in the underlying mechanism.
1. The user, whose browser has the Pico Lens add-on installed, navigates to a
login page.
2. The Pico Lens detects a login form on the page, and displays an authenti-
cation visual code containing the domain name of the website (Fig. 2.)
3. The user scans the code with their Pico.
4. If the user only has a single account with the website, as is common, this
step is skipped and the Pico proceeds to mutually authenticate the website.
Otherwise the user selects an account for the website from the list displayed
by the Pico (for each account the Pico device holds the username/password
credentials used to authenticate).
5. The Pico internally loads, fills in and submits the login form using its stored
username/password credentials for that account, tunnelling an end-to-end
HTTPS connection to the website through the Bluetooth PAN established
with the local computer.
5 To perform Pico authentication with a Pico-enabled website, the Pico Lens, which
rewrites legacy login pages to add a QR code to them, is clearly not required; how-
ever, some Pico browser add-on is still needed for receiving session delegation tokens
from the Pico device.
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6. The Pico receives the website’s response to the form submission and creates
a session delegation token consisting of any cookies set in the response and
the address it was redirected to.
7. The Pico sends the session delegation token to the user’s computer via the
Bluetooth PAN. In the web browser, the Pico Lens installs the set cookies
and follows the redirect, so that the user is logged in.
Fig. 2. QR code presented by the Pico Lens add-on for authentication to a website
that does not natively support Pico.
3.2 Pico Lens pairing
Before a user can log into a Lens-enabled website with their Pico, they must store
on in its encrypted storage their account credentials for that site and the Pico
must learn how to fill out the login page on behalf of the user. The interaction is
somewhat different to the “pairing” interaction with a Pico enabled site. Assume
the user already has a password-based account with the web site and now wants
to be able to log in with their Pico when viewing the site through the Pico Lens.
1. The user, whose web browser has the Pico Lens add-on installed, navigates
to a login page.
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2. The Pico Lens add-on detects a login form on the page and thus rewrites
the page6 to display an “authentication” visual code containing the domain
name of the web page (Fig. 2).
3. The user, having not yet stored any credentials to their Pico for this website,
ignores this first QR code, types their username and password in the login
form and submits it as if without Pico.
4. The Pico Lens add-on detects the form submission, captures the name-value
pairs being submitted, and offers to save these credentials on the user’s Pico
(Fig. 3), much as an in-browser password manager7 would.
5. The user accepts this offer and the add-on displays a “pairing” visual code
containing the submitted credentials8, as well as the domain name of the
website.
6. The user scans the visual code with their Pico.
7. The user confirms the pairing details and the username and password cre-
dentials are saved in the Pico’s encrypted database, with the website domain
as their lookup key.
Fig. 3. Dialogue presented by the Pico Lens add-on after a login form is submitted.
6 The Pico Lens at this stage has no idea that this is going to be a first-time pairing
rather than a regular login, so it behaves exactly as in the previous case.
7 We call “password manager” a piece of software that records username-password
pairs on behalf of the user and supplies them to verifiers as appropriate, saving the
user from having to remember and retype them. A password manager may be a
standalone program or it may be integrated in a web browser. Password managers
may store their database locally or in the cloud, and in cleartext or in encrypted form.
The latter case provides greater security but requires entering a master password.
8 The pairing code is currently unencrypted. If the visual code is observed during the
account pairing, the attacker gains the user’s password for that website.
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3.3 Pico Lens design trade-offs and future work
The current implementation largely mimics existing in-browser password man-
agers but is still a work in progress at the time of writing. Design decisions
still to be finalized, possibly with the help of user studies, include at least the
following.
First, we could do better in step 6, security-wise, by encrypting the username
and password to the Pico before encoding them into the QR code; but we’d need
some key for encrypting the message from Lens to Pico, and what would be the
most usable way of establishing that9?
Second, we might consider using radio rather than the visual channel in step
6, sparing the user from having to scan a visual code, although there may be
technical difficulties on platforms where the add-on is not allowed to open a
socket on the computer where the browser runs.
Third, instead of making it the responsibility of the user to choose a suitably
strong password, the Pico itself might choose a random password as hard as the
website’s policy will allow, to ensure greater randomness than can be expected
by letting a human choose a secret [2]; this would also ensure that passwords
are different on each site, thus limiting the damage for the user in case of server-
side compromise. The practical difficulty is that the Pico would have to be
informed about the constraints imposed by the website’s password policy (e.g.
certain characters disallowed, password length not to exceed some limit, etc.)10
or discover them by trial and error.
We assume that many web users will already be familiar with the concept of
a password manager since most modern web browsers incorporate one that pops
up and offers its services when appropriate. An encrypting password manager,
even though it stores your passwords on your computer thus exposing them
to network intruders11, offers a significant improvement in both security and
usability compared to plain passwords because it allows you to use stronger
passwords that are all different and that you don’t have to remember nor retype.
The fact that Pico can be seen as a portable password manager will allow users
to mentally associate the former to the latter, making it easier for people to
adopt Pico because they won’t have to form a totally new mental model for it.
In contrast to a password manager, the username-password pair is stored not
on the computer running the web browser but within the encrypted storage of
the Pico (just as the private-key cryptographic credentials would be in the fully-
Pico-enabled use case [11,12]) making the credential more strongly protected
against network attacks than with the in-browser password manager. Although
9 Bearing in mind scenarios in which one Lens serves several Pico devices, as when
several family members use the shared tablet in the living room.
10 It would be nice if websites published their password policy in a uniform machine-
readable form; and even nicer if they imposed no upper bounds on making passwords
arbitrarily long and complicated. As argued by Bonneau and Preibusch [4], websites
that impose such limits probably do so because they are not hashing their passwords.
11 A risk that is greatly reduced with Pico, which is a dedicated device not intended
to run other software.
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the implementation is very different, we are keen to maintain consistency in the
user’s mental model (“it’s my Pico that holds my credentials”) between the two
cases of visiting a Pico-enabled website and visiting a legacy website through
the Pico Lens.
The Pico visits the target website’s login page independently from the web
browser, rather than sending the password to the web browser; therefore, if the
terminal is compromised, only individual session cookies can be compromised,
rather than the long-term password. In this respect, too, the Pico Lens is a
security improvement on existing password managers.
The Pico Lens add-on cannot provide continuous authentications for non-
Pico-aware websites because, in order for continuous authentication to work, the
back-end must accept “pause” and “resume” methods for the session, besides
the standard “start” and “stop”. A session that has been paused is inactive but
retains its state; this must be explicitly supported by the back-end verifier. A
session with a non-Pico-enabled website can only be either “logged in” or “logged
out”.
In the implementation we had at the time of the SPW workshop, the Pico
connected to the user’s computer via a Bluetooth Personal Area Network (PAN)
and tunnelled out to remote services via this interface. Setting this up is, whist
reasonably straightforward, is non-trivial. Further work is required to ensure
that the solution is easily deployable by geeks and grannies alike.
Because Bluetooth isn’t universally deployed, especially on desktop machines,
we also considered using audio as an alternative channel, on the basis that prac-
tically every computer supports audio nowadays. Like radio, audio does not
provide data origin authenticity; it has lower capacity, it is more easily eaves-
dropped on, and it annoys the user. So we thought we might avoid the acoustic
transducers and wire up the devices directly through their ubiquitous 3.5 mm
phono connectors. This would provide data origin authenticity, higher capac-
ity, lower susceptibility to eavesdropping and no acoustic disturbance. However,
many users would find it too cumbersome to have to attach a cable, which they
often wouldn’t have with them anyway. Speaking of cables, it also felt quite odd
that, despite everything having dedicated digital connections such as USB, we
had to resort to hacking the audio I/O ports to achieve a simple data transfer
in a portable way that did not require installing device drivers and so forth.
Since presenting this work at the SPW in March 2014 we have been working
on replacing the Bluetooth PAN with a web-based rendezvous point. Whilst
introducing the need to securely pair the Pico and web browser, removing the
dependency on Bluetooth significantly simplifies deployment of the solution.
The current Pico Lens add-on implementation is a technology demonstrator
of the core insight that we can offer users the Pico experience even before their
favourite websites are Pico-enabled. For actual deployment, though, we may have
to revisit some of our implementation choices. For example, besides the other
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issues previously mentioned in this section, the leading browser is now Chrome12
rather than Firefox, although their add-on architectures are rather similar.
4 The “Pico Verifier” website plugin
Wordpress, originally a blogging platform, is currently the leading content man-
agement system on the web13. Our “Pico Verifier” plugin for Wordpress imple-
ments the back-end side of Pico for any website running Wordpress. It allows
users to log in to the website using the genuine Pico protocol (not a simulation,
as would be the case with the Pico Lens) while of course still allowing traditional
password-based authentication.
With the Pico Verifier plugin installed on a Wordpress website, the login
page is modified to include a Pico visual code, alongside the usual username and
password prompt. Unlike the visual codes added by the Pico Lens, the ones the
Wordpress plugin adds are in the HTML returned by the web server. The Pico
visual code contains the name, address and public key of the website (see Fig.
4).
To authenticate to the Wordpress website, the user scans this QR code with
her Pico. Provided the Pico is already paired with her user account on the
website, the Pico then initiates the mutual authentication protocol of section
3.1 with the website’s Pico verifier (also provided by our Wordpress plugin).
If authentication is successful, the Pico verifier returns to the Pico a session
delegation token, which the Pico uses to delegate its authority to the web browser
as discussed in section 2.
Users can create a Pico-enabled account by scanning another visual code
(similar to the one shown in Fig. 4) which the plugin adds to the Wordpress
account creation page. The plugin also adds a “Pico” section to the Wordpress
account management page. Here users can unlink a Pico which is already linked
with their account and a QR code is added to allow the user to link a new Pico.
For administrators, new Pico-related settings are added to the site’s settings
page.
Normally, once mutually authenticated, the Pico and the service execute a
continuous authentication protocol over the established secure channel. When
the Pico is out-of-range of either its Picosiblings or the terminal, the session is
first paused and then eventually terminated. Terminating a session is straightfor-
ward. Pausing is more difficult, as Wordpress wasn’t designed with pause/resume
in mind, and this feature isn’t currently provided by our plugin.
To experience a Pico compatible Wordpress blog requires that both websites
and web visitors install and configure some software. The demands placed on
the website are relatively modest—to install our Pico Verifier Wordpress plugin.
In contrast, each user (prover) is required to install and setup multiple pieces of
12 As of January 2014, Chrome holds 55.7% market share, with Firefox a distant second
at 26.9%, according to W3schools statistics (http://www.w3schools.com/browsers/
browsers_stats.asp).
13 See footnote 2.
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{"serviceName ": "Some Wordpress Blog",
"serviceUri ": "http :// someblog.com/pico :8080" ,
"servicePublicKey ": "MFUw ... iC8U",
"signature ": "MEAC ...9 uGn",
"TYPE": "KeyAuthenticationVisualCode"
}
Fig. 4. Example visual code added to the login page by the Wordpress plugin.
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software (browser add-on, Bluetooth device driver etc.) and to provide network
connectivity between the Pico, their computer and the website. Our future work
includes simplifying these requirements in order to make Pico easier to deploy.
5 The “Pico Prover” smartphone app
It seems prudent that an authentication token holding all your login credentials
should not be a general-purpose computing platform, with unfettered networking
facilities, on which users merrily install arbitrary code of dubious provenance
[9]. For this reason (as well as to be simple and easy to use) the Pico client
is ultimately intended to be a dedicated single-purpose hardware device rather
than a smartphone app. However, users tend to be extremely reluctant to carry
one more device. And a smartphone can already simulate, if not the form factor,
at least most of the intended functions of a Pico. It therefore seems reasonable
for us to release a smartphone app that will allow users to try out the Pico
functionality at no cost—without having to acquire a physical Pico (which we
haven’t yet built anyway) nor having to carry one around (assuming they’d
already carry their smartphone regardless). While they’re trying out Pico, users
may still retain traditional passwords for the few accounts they consider most
valuable and only use Pico for their more numerous lower-value ones. The risk
introduced by the possibility of their long term credentials being exposed by
malware on the smartphone is therefore limited.
We consider a dedicated tamper-resistant hardware token and the use of a
consumer computing device such as smartphone as being at opposite ends of a
design spectrum. Within this spectrum there are several other interesting op-
tions, such as the use of a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). A TEE is an
isolated execution environment in which sensitive or security enforcing functions
can be executed. The Protection Profile for TEE—produced by the Global Plat-
form collaboration—targets the Common Criteria Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL2 (“Structurally tested”). Thus an implementation of the Pico Prover App
using this technology would offer security benefits over a basic smartphone app.
Despite TEEs based on ARM’s TrustZone technology being present in over
100 million handsets, the software running in the isolated environment has, until
recently, been tightly controlled by handset manufacturers. With the advent of
the Samsung S4 the TEE has been opened up to third party developers and this
trend is likely to continue.
Despite the security benefits provided by a TEE, ensuring a trusted path to
the user is a significant residual problem: malware can’t access the data segment
of the TEE-secured Pico Prover app, but it could simulate its screen. Because
Pico does not require the user to remember or enter secrets, such concerns are
somewhat mitigated. However, careful thought is needed to ensure that a mali-
cious app can’t trick the user in some elaborate way or abuse the API between
the rich and trusted side to extract sensitive data such as keying material. A
detailed analysis of Pico executing within a TEE on a smartphone would make
interesting future work.
13
During the transition phase, the smartphone app will support both the native
Pico protocol and also the Pico Lens protocol. Therefore, an important constraint
placed on the Pico Lens solution is that it should be as usable as the native Pico.
Distributing the Pico Prover as a free app allows us to crowd-source feedback
about the usability of the solution and ensure that we are meeting this goal.
6 User acceptance
To date the security and usability benefits of Pico have only been considered by
technologists [3]. The Unified Theory of Acceptance and Usage of Technology
(UTAUT) [13] applies to technology adoption the ideas of the more general The-
ory of Planned Behaviour (ToPB) from social psychology. The UTAUT model
postulates that a user’s intention to adopt a new technology is driven by four
constructs:
Performance Expectancy
The root component of which is perceived usefulness.
Effort Expectancy
The root component of which is ease of use.
Social Influence
Similar to social norms in the ToPB model.
Facilitating Conditions
Objective factors that influence the ease of adoption of the technology.
As users often hold inaccurate notions of security and of the importance of
security measures [1,10], the stated security benefits need to be reconciled with
the benefits that end users perceive Pico to offer. However, without a working
implementation and more importantly without compatible services to log in to,
validating these benefits would be tricky. In our initial work we have focused
on providing “Facilitating Conditions” that allow us to perform large scale user
studies to validate Pico’s assumed benefits.
The solutions presented in this paper allow Pico to be adopted by a broad user
community and used with legacy services based on password authentication. The
insights gained from users adopting Pico in a day-to-day setting will highlight
what we got wrong and inform changes to our design. Reporting and acting on
these findings is a significant and exciting part of the future direction of the Pico
project.
7 Conclusions
We still believe that, in our quest to produce a more usable and more secure
password replacement, it would be a mistake to limit our horizon to solutions
that are compatible with passwords: it may well be that better solutions exist
beyond that horizon, and we want the freedom to explore those regions of the
design space too.
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On the other hand, we fully realize that a realistic solution requires a plausible
path to deployment and that, when encouraging major players to adopt Pico,
we cannot act as if passwords weren’t already a strongly entrenched incumbent.
The vicious circle undeniably exists: websites won’t have any incentive to support
Pico authentication until users already have Pico devices, and users won’t have
any incentive to get a Pico unless it works with their websites of interest.
Our strategy is therefore to break this vicious circle in several places. We
have shown how the Pico Lens browser add-on allows users to reap the benefits
of a Pico device even before the websites support it. We have shown how the Pico
Verifier website plugin allows webmasters (of Wordpress sites) to support Pico
at no development cost. And we have shown how the Pico Prover smartphone
app allows users to try out Pico for some of their accounts without having to
buy anything or carry any additional gadgets.
A significant advantage of this bootstrapping strategy is that allows us not to
compromise on the purity of the Pico design: the clean-slate Pico is incompatible
with passwords, but the solutions presented above are stepping stones that bridge
this compatibility gap because they interwork with both legacy passwords and
Pico, thus allowing for a transition phase.
Our next step will be more organizational than technological: we need to get
the website operators on board—especially the big ones. If we can demonstrate
that a critical mass of users finds the Pico Prover app and the Pico Lens add-on
to be more usable than passwords (and we’ll have to work hard at simplifying
the installation process) we’ll be in a good position to persuade the big players
that it’s worth supporting Pico as an alternative authentication method. This
will in turn attract more users and we’ll finally move from a vicious to a virtuous
circle.
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